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ABSTRACT 
The basic approach to designing nuclear facilities in the United States does not 
currently reflect the routine consideration of proliferation resistance and international 
safeguards.  The fully integrated design process is an approach for bringing 
consideration of international safeguards and proliferation resistance, together with 
state safeguards and security, fully into the design process from the very beginning, 
while integrating them sensibly and synergistically with the other project functions.  In 
view of the recently established GNEP principles agreed to by the United States and at 
least eighteen other countries, this paper explores such an integrated approach, and its 
potential to help fulfill the new internationally driven design requirements with improved 
efficiencies and reduced costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The statement of principles for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) has now 
been officially endorsed by eighteen or more countries, including the United States 
(U.S.).  The overarching mission of this international movement is to support the global 
growth of nuclear energy while reducing nuclear security risks.1
Included are risks associated with state level threats that would manifest in the 
acquisition by a country of weapons-usable nuclear materials from either declared or 
undeclared activities.  Proliferation resistance is one defense against these state level 
threats, and is defined as “those characteristics of a nuclear energy system that impede 
the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by 
the state seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 2
Additionally, the GNEP defenses include strict observance of present and enhanced 
IAEA safeguards, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and maintaining the highest 
levels of nuclear safety and physical security.  State safeguards and security, such as 
those specified by DOE Order 470.4 are the defenses against subnational threats such 
as terrorism, theft and sabotage that would be carried out by a subnational adversary – 
an individual or group, including potentially some form of ‘insider.’ 3
Defenses against ‘natural hazards’ are the domain of safety, which is also emphasized 
by GNEP.  Thus, the GNEP vision requires effective defenses against essentially all 
threats, whether natural or man-made in origin. 
The 2002 Como II conference usefully considered the nature of the steps that might be 
undertaken to strengthen proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system.2 The team 
defined intrinsic features as those that result from the design of the nuclear system, 
including those that enable the efficient application of extrinsic measures.  The PRPP 
group subsequently expanded this definition, noting that intrinsic features include 
inherent physical properties of the system, and are in general very robust and desirable 
because they are very difficult to modify or overcome.4  Extrinsic PR measures are 
associated with the states’ decisions and undertakings - examples include treaties, 
commercial and legal arrangements, export controls, or actions to support UN 
Resolution 1540, and they include the application of international safeguards.  Thus PR 
measures are intrinsic or extrinsic, and they may be technical or institutional in nature. 
Some very effective intrinsic PR features can be implemented at the highest level of the 
global fuel cycle architecture.  Examples would include the selection of the fuel cycle 
itself, e.g.  uranium and/or plutonium fuels, once through or a specific recycling process, 
and the use and deployment of uranium enrichment.  Other examples are those GNEP 
features that seek at the highest level to avoid or minimize the spread of nuclear 
materials and technologies of interest to potential proliferators.  The effectiveness of 
such features can be illustrated through the risk equation.  The risk from a threat is 
defined as being equal to the product of the probability that an event will take place, 
times the probability that the event will produce a given consequence.  (Note that, by 
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definition, the proliferation risk is zero in the case of a nuclear weapons state using its 
own technology or material, because they cannot ‘proliferate’ to themselves.)  High level 
intrinsic features can make a particular proliferation event less likely, or can cause the 
state to attempt a path that is more prone to failure.  Either way, the product of the risk 
equation, and thus the proliferation risk, is reduced. 
Additionally, intrinsic PR features can be implemented at the level of the nuclear facility 
design.  Examples include features that would make it very difficult or impossible to 
divert nuclear material without being detected.  Another very important example would 
be design features that facilitate transparency and verification at the international level, 
or rather, features that enhance safeguardability.  Safeguardability is defined as “the 
ease with which a system can be effectively and efficiently put under international 
safeguards.” 4  Thus, it is clear that to strengthen the defenses against proliferation at 
the level of the nuclear fuel cycle facility, emphasis must be given in the facility design 
process to the identification and incorporation of intrinsic design features for proliferation 
resistance and physical protection, as well as features that will enhance the cost 
effective application of both international and state safeguards.  The modern challenge 
is to meet all of these requirements in an integrated, synergistic and cost effective 
manner. 
A NEW INTEGRATION CHALLENGE 
In order to fulfill the GNEP vision a modern fuel cycle facility must fulfill internationally 
driven requirements such as proliferation resistance and incorporation of international 
safeguards, in addition to fulfilling the state level requirements for safety, safeguards 
and physical security required by the host state.  In the case of the U.S. this represents 
a de facto change in practice, since, historically, international safeguards have not been 
routinely applied to nuclear facilities in nuclear weapons states, and nonproliferation 
considerations have become dramatically more urgent in recent years because of the 
changing threat concerns and the global nuclear renaissance.  Additionally, perhaps for 
the reason that few new domestic nuclear facilities have been built in recent decades, 
the current environment that anticipates new nuclear construction in the U.S. is driving 
what appears to be a dynamic process with regard to updating state safety and 
safeguards, and possibly also security approaches.  Much progress has been made in 
many fields since nuclear construction was thriving in the U.S. some 20 to 30 years ago 
– in a then very different threat environment - and it is useful and important to examine 
all practices from the perspective of the latest standards. 
FULLY INTEGRATED DESIGN PROCESS 
Figure 1 illustrates the integration challenge that is presently posed by the design of a 
new nuclear facility within the U.S. DOE system, when the international considerations 
of proliferation resistance and international safeguards are included. 
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At the bottom of Fig. 1 are the bulk of the ‘usual design activities’ for a project, including 
process design, instrumentation and controls, facility and equipment layout, and so 
forth, but as defined in this figure, specifically excluding those matters relating to safety 
and nuclear security.  These activities are prescribed in DOE documents, and in the 
case of a capital construction project are governed by a DOE order.5  Included at the 
top of Fig. 1 is the ongoing safety related development being driven by the U.S. DOE 
Integrated Safety Management program, to emphasize and formally codify the inclusion 
of Safety in Design in the design process for nuclear facilities.  The effort has resulted in 
the publication of a draft standard, U.S. DOE Standard 1189, “Integration of Safety into 
the Design Process.” 6
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Figure 1.  The Fully Integrated Design Process. 
The yellow boxes included in the center of Fig. 1 focus the discussion on the design 
activities to mitigate nuclear security threats (from both state and subnational actors).  
The orders, guides and manuals covering DOE Safeguards and Security address the 
requirements and activities associated with defining and defending against the 
subnational threats, notably this includes the application of DOE Material Control and 
Accounting (safeguards) and physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as some 
other items such as personnel, cyber, and information security.7
The lower two yellow boxes represent the activities to defend against proliferation.  The 
specific implementation of international safeguards in the case of projects in the U.S. 
would presumably be based on the standard IAEA safeguards approaches, while 
5 
8th International Conference on Facility Operations – Safeguards Interface, March 30 – April 4, 2008, Portland, OR, on CD-Rom, 
Danielle Peterson, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.  O.  Box 999, K8-16, Richland, WA, 99352 (2008) 
accounting for the specifics of U.S. agreements with the IAEA through the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP).8  It is 
useful to note that the activities to support international safeguards include 
consideration of both intrinsic design features that would enhance safeguardability, as 
well as the application of extrinsic measures that would be required for independent 
verification in a completed facility. 
SAFEGUARDS BY DESIGN 
In the center of Fig. 1, a larger concept has been introduced that spans proliferation 
resistance, international safeguards, and state safeguards and security.  This is the 
concept of ‘Safeguards by Design’, which we define further via Fig. 2 as, “the inclusion 
of proliferation resistance, international safeguards, state safeguards and physical 
security, as full and equal partners in the design process.” 9  Essentially Safeguards by 
Design (SBD) puts all design matters relating to nuclear security under one hat.  The 
fully integrated design process is then one which integrates safety and SBD into the 
context of a larger project. 
The foundation upon which SBD is conducted is defined by the full set of requirements 
and success criteria (metrics by which one can assess fulfillment of a requirement) for 
the project.  The SBD process includes the activities by designers to apply know-how, 
tools, and models – including supporting experimental data – in the context of a nuclear 
facility design project. 
‘Safeguards By Design’
Early focus and contribution by expert teams
“The integration of safeguards, physical protection and 
proliferation resistance as full and equal partners in the 
design process of a nuclear energy system or facility.”
- Safeguards by Design -
Modeling and 
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Design Tools 
Requirements
Figure 2.  Safeguards by Design. 
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Figure 3.  State and international safeguards, as well as many other operations of a 
nuclear facility depend on the same requirements foundation. 
The Como II discussions in 2002 articulated the high level fundamentals of proliferation 
resistance, defined a new vocabulary for nonproliferation, and also foresaw the 
methodological approaches that should be developed and used to define and assess 
the robustness of nuclear energy systems of the future.2  The Como II team suggested 
a three pronged approach to methodology for PR, to include a checklist, and qualitative 
and quantitative assessment approaches.  It is notable that in the ensuing years 
substantial progress has been made towards developing methodologies for all three of 
these approaches.  The IAEA led INPRO program has followed the checklist approach, 
which has been developed to the point where it has been used in the assessment of the 
DUPIC fuel cycle.10, 11  The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) established an 
international working group that has been developing a risk-based approach to the 
qualitative and quantitative assessment of the relative PR and physical protection 
robustness of alternative nuclear energy systems.4 The current application of these two 
alternative methodologies to example and real world problems may well form the basis 
for informing future revisions of these methodologies.  While these approaches should 
not yet be considered fully mature, there is mounting evidence that they can be usefully 
applied to real world problems, both at the global architecture level as well as at the 
facility design level. 
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Two further observations should be made regarding Fig. 3.  First, it should be noted that 
the functions specifically mentioned are all very much concerned with tracking nuclear 
material, though perhaps for different reasons.  The second observation relates to the 
strong interdependence of state safeguards and the international safeguards.  This 
highlights the importance of considering them together in a project, as opposed to 
treating the international safeguards as an independent ‘add on.’ 
THE DESIGN PROCESS 
Consideration of the nature of the design process itself will be useful in informing 
approaches to this new, integrated design problem. 
Figure 4 illustrates notionally how the intensity of the design activity changes as the 
project progresses.  First of all, it should be noted that the foundation for all of the 
activities - and the yardstick against which to measure their worthiness – is comprised 
of the formal requirements and success criteria that have been established for the 
project.  It is essential that a design project begin with the complete and clear 
specification of all relevant requirements, and that success criteria be developed and 
agreed upon that define the objective measures by which one assesses fulfillment of the 
requirements.  The modern GNEP design problem will require establishing new 
requirements and criteria where current U.S. regulations and practices are silent, most 
notably for proliferation resistance, if it is to be included in a project.  A complete and 
clear statement of measurable requirements is essential. 
The second important observation is reflected in the curve representing the application 
of expert know-how.  In the case of a DOE project this early portion of the project might 
represent the project initiation and pre-conceptual or conceptual design phases.  At this 
early stage of the project, the project team is wrestling with fundamental questions such 
as mission need, as in, “Does it make sense to pursue a facility like this at all?”  Design 
details may be few and far between, and if they exist they are likely to be fairly high 
level considerations on the order of, “Should we build a 1,000 MWe nuclear power 
reactor?”  During the following conceptual design phase, the design team is seeking to 
establish alternative approaches to meeting the mission requirements, and to identify 
cost and risk ranges for the alternative approaches.  Again, only high level information 
may be available, and the designers are dealing with scoping type questions such as, 
“Should this be a PWR, BWR or VHTR?” 
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Figure 4.  Relative intensity of effort during the design process. 
A salient observation is that in the earliest project stages it is the application of know-
how by the expert design team members that is the most important contributor.  This is 
why it is absolutely essential that the important project requirements are represented by 
experts from the very beginning of the project.  Next to defining a clear and measurable 
project requirement for ‘Factor X,’ perhaps the single biggest contribution one could 
make to the cost-effective success of ‘Factor X’ in a project would be to have a ‘Factor 
X’ expert participate fully in the project from the very beginning.  He would contribute to 
the mission need phase, as well as the drafting of the project’s Functional and 
Operational Requirements document that essentially defines the project.  Such 
considerations are included in the DOE approach to safeguards and security as 
articulated in the published 413.3A series of documents, as well as in the standard 
being developed for safety-in-design.5, 7, 12  The fully integrated design process should 
therefore include experts in nonproliferation and international safeguards as members 
of the design team, from the very beginning, together with their safeguards and security 
teammates and the rest of the project team.  They should cooperate closely with the 
other disciplines detailed in Fig. 3. 
The third important observation from Fig. 4 is represented by the curve labeled ‘detailed 
analysis.’  It is an interesting conundrum that it is at the earliest stages of the project 
that one has the opportunity for the greatest beneficial impact through the establishment 
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of intrinsic design features at the lowest cost, and yet, it is precisely at this stage that 
the fewest design details are known.  This further underscores the importance of the 
early and full participation of relevant experts.  Also, it points to the usefulness of higher 
level design tools that can provide meaningful direction in the absence of specific detail.  
A higher level checklist or qualitative approach may be very useful at this stage, such as 
a qualitative application of the PRPP methodology, as well as the application of higher 
level modeling and simulation to explore alternatives. 
It is only as further details become available that other detailed analysis techniques can 
be usefully employed.  As new and improved tools are developed to aid in the 
assessment of proliferation resistance, safeguardability, physical protection and state 
safeguards they will find useful and increasingly intense application in the process.  In a 
project sense, they will increasingly reduce the intensity of expert know-how and 
replace it with detailed analysis.13, 14
CONCLUSIONS 
The challenge for an integrated design process is to effectively and efficiently 
incorporate international safeguards, proliferation resistance, and nuclear security and 
safeguards into the entire design effort from the very beginning.  Successful integration 
will include: 
• Early and continued involvement of appropriate experts (physical security, state 
safeguards, international safeguards, proliferation resistance, etc.) in the design 
process, 
• Early, complete, and clear establishment of the requirements and success 
criteria, 
• Strong encouragement to identify intrinsic facility features early in the design 
process, 
• Strong encouragement to develop synergistic, cross-discipline design solutions, 
• Meaningful cost analysis to balance near term investment in intrinsic features 
versus long term investment in extrinsic (operating) costs, 
• Development of standards and guidance to assist establishment of requirements 
and direct the inclusion of tools and analysis techniques, and 
• Identification of extrinsic features (at the facility and higher level). 
As countries prepare to build new nuclear fuel cycle facilities, there must be a 
complementary preparation to advance and improve the safeguardability of those 
facilities.  Fully integrating state safeguards and security, international safeguards, and 
proliferation resistance into the overall design process will enhance the cost 
effectiveness of providing for nuclear security, and increase the efficacy of those same 
measures. 
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